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SIGNS INSCRIBED ON A GATE: THE IMPACT OF VAN BUREN
V. UNITED STATES ON CIVIL CLAIMS UNDER THE
COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
SCOTT T. LASHWAY & MATTHEW M.K. STEIN*
This Article addresses the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s June
2021 decision in Van Buren v. United States on what constitutes
“authorization” to access a computer under the Federal Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)—a law that imposes both criminal and
private civil liability for violations—and concludes that, so far, the
Van Buren decision has not rendered the CFAA toothless. The
Introduction briefly explains the history of the CFAA, a summary of
why it was enacted, how organizations have relied upon it as an
important tool to protect themselves from computer hackers and
increased cybersecurity risks, and a Circuit of Appeals split about
what it means to “exceed authorization.” The Article then, in a
section titled “Exceeding Authorized Access: All That Is Not
Permitted Is Forbidden,” tells the sordid tale of what happened to Van
Buren and how the U.S. Supreme Court resolved his case, ultimately
by reversing the Court of Appeals’s ruling affirming his CFAA
conviction in an attempt to resolve the circuit split. It concludes in
“Protecting Systems with a Sign on the Doorposts” by examining the
two cases that, through December 2021, considered the authorization
issue and what they indicate about the future of the post-Van Buren
CFAA.

INTRODUCTION
Enacted in the 1980s amid rising use of personal computers and

Scott Lashway is the co-chair of Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP’s privacy and data
security practice and managing partner of the firm’s Boston office. Matthew Stein is a special
counsel in that practice and office. They can be reached at slashway@manatt.com and
mstein@manatt.com, respectively.
*
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concerns about hacking,1 the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
imposes criminal penalties on anyone who accesses protected computers
without authorization or beyond what they are authorized to access.2
Indeed, concerns about a “hacker mentality” and public indifference
initially motivated Congress to act:
[T]here is a tremendous attitudinal problem that gives the Committee
some concern. People can relate to mugging a little old lady and
taking her pocketbook, but the perception is that perhaps there is not
something so wrong about taking information by use of a device called
a computer even if it costs the economy millions now and potentially
billions in the future.3

A private right of action was later added4 to “boost the deterrence of
the statute by allowing aggrieved individuals to obtain relief.”5 The
CFAA has been amended eleven other times since its enactment.
Armed with a private right of action, companies historically used the
CFAA to respond to incursions into their computing systems.6 Even
though civil CFAA claims require showing a loss of $5,000 or more
related to the unauthorized access, in many situations that is a low
threshold to meet, whereas other elements of the claim are easier to prove
than what is required for a common-law trespass claim.7 For example, to

1. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 8–12 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689,
3691; S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 2–3 (1986), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2484.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), as initially enacted,
criminalized knowingly accessing computers to obtain financial records of financial institutions
or information the United States determined must remain secret for national defense or foreign
relations purposes or to use, modify, destroy, or disclose information in a United States
government computer. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2102, 98 Stat. 1837. It was amended in 1986 to criminalize access with
an intention to defraud and to change the criminalized conduct from “knowingly” accessing to
“intentionally” accessing. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2,
100 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030). The latter change was made “to
focus Federal criminal prosecutions on those whose conduct evinces a clear intent to enter,
without proper authorization, computer files or data belonging to another.” S. REP. NO. 99-432,
at 6.
3. H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 12. “But the reason we were hoping it might not be made
public is because it gives everyone else in town the same idea. They want to try it also to see if
they can do the same thing someone else did.” Id. at 11 (quoting Dr. Wilbur Miller).
4. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 290001, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g)).
5. S. REP. NO. 101-544, at 6–7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723, 1732.
6. Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2241 (2004)
(“[N]etwork resource owners wishing to block unwanted uses of their systems have relied
mainly on trespass-to-chattels and CFAA claims.”).
7. Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Two
Problems and Two Solutions, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 429, 447 n.131.
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make out a trespass claim, a plaintiff often has to plead that its ownership
in the computer system was interfered with, or that it was temporarily
dispossessed or deprived, or that the system’s quality or value was
impaired.8 A CFAA claim does not require any of that. Instead, as
commonly pled by companies, the CFAA requires a private plaintiff to
plead that (1) the defendant accessed a protected computer without
authorization, intentionally or knowingly with intent to defraud; (2) the
defendant obtained information, obtained something of value, or caused
damage; and (3) the plaintiff experienced a loss of at least $5,000 (loss
here defined as a reasonable cost to the victim).9
Civil actions have brought “the development of a body of civil
precedents interpreting the Act broadly”10 and concerns about their impact
on criminal CFAA proceedings.11 It also led to a circuit split on whether
access could be limited to certain purposes.12 For example, in those
circuits that rejected a purpose limitation on access under the CFAA, one
arguably could access a protected computer for almost any reason with
impunity under the CFAA if that person was authorized to access the
protected computer.13
That circuit split has led to the potential for inequitable results for the
same conduct. In 2019, the Ninth Circuit determined that a company that
scraped data from a social networking website may not face civil
liability,14 while the Eleventh Circuit upheld a felony conviction and an
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217–18 (AM. L. INST. 1965) (listing the
elements of trespass to chattel).
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C), (a)(4), (a)(5)(B), (a)(5)(C), (c)(4)(A)(i)(I), (e)(8), (g).
Even though the CFAA has the word “fraud” in its title, not all claims brought under it sound
in fraud and require satisfying the heightened pleading standard for claims sounding in fraud.
See, e.g., NetApp, Inc. v. Nimble Storage, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 816, 833–34 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
In addition, CFAA civil claims can be predicated on other acts, such as transmitting malware to
intentionally cause damage or transmitting threats to cause damage to a protected computer if
done with the intention to extort something of value, or on other damages, such as a physical
injury, modifying or impairing medical examination or treatment, or damaging a computer used
by or for the United States for purposes of administering justice, defense, or national security.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A), (a)(7)(A), (c)(4)(A)(i)(II), (c)(4)(A)(i)(III), (c)(4)(A)(i)(V); see
also § 1030(a), (c)(4)(A)(i).
10. Brenton, supra note 7, at 429.
11. E.g., Bellia, supra note 6, at 2258.
12. Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1653, 1653 n.2 (2021).
13. The exception may be if the person knowingly transmitted code or a command that
damaged the protected computer because that provision of the CFAA does not turn on whether
the access was authorized. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A). The activity could also give rise to
“other causes of action, such as copyright infringement, misappropriation, unjust enrichment,
conversion, breach of contract, or breach of privacy.” hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp. 938
F.3d 985, 1004 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2752 (2021). Discussion of those other
claims is beyond the scope of this Article.
14. hiQ Labs, 938 F.3d at 1003–04. “Scraping involves extracting data from a website
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eighteen-month prison sentence for a police officer who accessed a police
database using his credentials merely because his reason for doing so was
improper.15
That police officer was Sergeant Nathan Van Buren, and his
conviction led to the Supreme Court’s attempt to resolve the circuit split.16
I. EXCEEDING AUTHORIZED ACCESS: ALL THAT IS NOT PERMITTED
IS FORBIDDEN
Van Buren was convicted by a jury in federal court for honestservices wire fraud and for violating the CFAA.17
His case began with a “friendly relationship” he developed with a
widower, despite warnings from senior members of his police department
to be careful in dealing with the widower.18 Court opinions suggest the
warnings were well founded. The widower “allegedly fancied younger
women, including minors and prostitutes,” he “allegedly paid prostitutes
to spend time with him and then often accused the women of stealing the
money he gave them,” and he allegedly “surreptitiously recorded and
harassed” “[a]t least one woman.”19 Van Buren “often handled the
disputes between [the widower] and various women.”20 Based on that
relationship, and facing financial difficulties, Van Buren asked the
widower for a loan.21 To the widower, things were different: the request
was a “shak[e] down for his money,” he told detectives, providing a
recording of his conversations with Van Buren.22
After the recording and complaint made its way to the FBI, a plan
was hatched. The widower “was to give Van Buren some cash, and in
exchange, [he] was to ask Van Buren to tell him whether Carson, a woman
he supposedly met at a strip club, was an undercover police officer.”23
The widower did so, couching it as a desire “to know . . . before he would
pursue her further [romantically]. Van Buren agreed to help.”24 The two
and copying it into a structured format, allowing for data manipulation or analysis”; it is
“typically done by a web robot or ‘bot.’” Id. at 991 n.3.
15. Van Buren, 141 S. Ct. at 1653. The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in hiQ Labs for reconsideration in light of its decision in Van Buren. See generally
hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 141 S. Ct. 2752 (2021).
16. See generally Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648 (2021).
17. United States v. Van Buren, 940 F.3d 1192, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019), rev’d, 141 S. Ct.
1648 (2021).
18. Van Buren, 141 S. Ct. at 1653.
19. Van Buren, 940 F.3d at 1197.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting the widower’s statement to law enforcement).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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discussed Van Buren searching the police database for the woman’s
license plate, and he did—but for “a fake license plate number created by
the FBI” and supplied by the widower.25
The FBI confronted Van Buren. He confessed to lying to the widower
about why he asked for the money, he confessed to receiving money from
the widower to run the plate search, and he confessed that “he knew doing
so was ‘wrong.’”26 He was convicted.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Van Buren’s conviction for
violating the CFAA, reasoning under circuit precedent that misuse, or use
for an improper purpose, of a computer or database that the user is
lawfully permitted to access can violate the CFAA: a purpose limitation.27
To that court, authorization to access a computer can be for a limited
purpose, and any purpose not permitted is forbidden and may even be the
basis for a felony.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, ultimately reversing the
Eleventh Circuit. To the Court, authorization acted as a gatekeeping
function, and individuals were either authorized to access a system or they
were not.28 The purpose in using the system was immaterial—there is no
purpose limitation—and because Van Buren was authorized to access the
database, he did not violate the CFAA.29
Along the way, the Court made three important observations. First,
a purpose-based limitation criminalizes ordinary conduct, such as when
“an employee . . . sends a personal e-mail or reads the news using her
work computer” in contravention of her employer’s policy that
“computers and electronic devices can be used only for business
purposes.”30 That would turn “millions of otherwise law-abiding citizens
[into] criminals.”31
Second, a purpose-based limitation can be arbitrary. The CFAA
protects only against misuse of access and not against misuse of
information obtained through that access.32 Depending upon how a policy
is written, the same conduct could be prohibited, but only one potentially
criminalized under the CFAA.33 That is because determining an
individual’s purpose in accessing a system requires understanding their

25. Id. at 1197–98.
26. Id. at 1198.
27. See id. at 1207–08. The Eleventh Circuit also vacated Van Buren’s conviction for
honest-services wire fraud, based on improper jury instructions. See id. at 1203–05.
28. Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1658–59 (2021).
29. See id. at 1662.
30. Id. at 1651, 1661.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1662.
33. Id.
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motive and intended use. Mere access, without more, is effectively testing
access rights, which is inherent to giving access to a system.
Third, although the CFAA’s authorization tests only a “gates-up-ordown inquiry,” caring not why the authorization is used, the authorization
need not be code-based.34 Left open is if authorization can be granted, or
limited, by a contract or policy, despite longstanding urging to require
code-based authorization as the test for access rights under the CFAA.35
Someone with the technical ability to access a system or a portion of a
system may yet violate the CFAA if, say, a contract prohibits from them
from doing so.
II. PROTECTING SYSTEMS WITH A SIGN ON THE DOORPOSTS
As Congress intended,36 the CFAA has become an important tool in
companies’ arsenals to protect their information. And even though Van
Buren answers some questions about the CFAA’s scope, it leaves more
critical questions unanswered that impact how companies use the CFAA
in civil litigation. For example, must the gates be technical, or can the
restrictions be based solely on a contract or policy? What happens if,
because of a mistake, something that should have been behind a technical
gate restricting access was not? And in that scenario, what if a contract,
term of use, or policy forbade the access?
Two decisions following Van Buren show that the CFAA retains its
importance and teeth, even with the purpose inquiry foreclosed: access
may not be authorization, and authorization or its limits could be inferred
from context and terms of use.
On the idea that having access may not mean having authorization:
In Bowen v. Porsche Cars, N.A., Inc., a motion to dismiss ruling, a court
upheld claims that alleged automatic installation of a software update to a
car infotainment system (which allegedly caused the infotainment system
to malfunction and constantly reboot) violated the CFAA.37 The software
updates were transmitted to the car’s satellite antenna, generally used to
listen to satellite radio in the car, and related generally to the satellite radio
functionality in the infotainment system.38
34. Id. at 1658–59, 1659 nn.8–9. Code-based authorization is a form of access control
that relies upon someone’s individual account credentials and account access privileges, which
are among commonly used technical controls to protect information, or other technical
information to determine if the person should be allowed to access information on a computer.
35. See, e.g., Brief of Professor Orin S. Kerr as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
7, Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648 (2021) (No. 19-783), 2020 WL 4003433; Bellia,
supra note 6, at 2253–58.
36. See S. REP. NO. 101-544, at 6–7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723, 1732.
37. Bowen v. Porsche Cars, N.A., Inc., No. 21-CV-471-MHC, 2021 WL 4726586, at *1,
*4–6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 20, 2021).
38. Id. at *1.
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But to the court, “nothing in the facts alleged implies that access to
the antenna or consent to receive satellite radio transmissions is the same
as an authorization to directly access, much less modify, the [infotainment
system],” which is “a distinctly different device” from the satellite antenna
and more than a mere satellite radio receiver.39 So, the car manufacturer
allegedly exceeded its authorization to access the infotainment system by
causing the update to be installed.40 Consistent with Van Buren, but not
made under its framework,41 this analysis breaks down a single system
with a single authorization—a single computer system in the car to which
access to connect was authorization—into components, each with its own
potential authorization.
On the idea that limits to authorization could be inferred from context
and terms of use: In Vox Marketing Group v. Prodigy Promos, a summary
judgment decision, the plaintiff had made pricing proposals and packing
lists available to its current and potential customers on the internet, behind
a username/password gate.42 Visits to the site, or to specific proposals or
lists, required entering credentials.43 But as the court relays, at some point
the password protection was disabled for the pricing proposal and packing
list URLs, making each accessible to anyone on the internet,44 no
password needed.
Later, a competitor received a copy of a pricing proposal, saw the
proposal URL on the sheet, and discovered that the homepage of the site
was protected by a username and password (which it did not have), but
that the specific URL was not and it could download the pricing

39. Id. at *5.
40. The court’s reasoning focuses on the vehicle owners’ alleged lack of consent to
installation of the update, and not whether the manufacturer was authorized to proceed in the
manner it did. Id. at *4–5. It may be because the court was limited at the pleading stage and
could not consider, for example, terms of use accompanying use of the infotainment system or
satellite radio functionality in the car or whether the vehicle owner had taken affirmative steps
to install the updates. See id. In doing so, the court distinguished similar cases about updates
where the device owner or user had taken affirmative steps to download or install the updates.
Id. at *4.
41. See Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1662 (2021) (“[A]n individual
‘exceeds authorized access’ when he accesses a computer with authorization but then obtains
information located in particular areas of the computer—such as files, folders, or databases—
that are off limits to him.”).
42. Vox Mktg. Grp. v. Prodigy Promos, No. 18-CV-632, 2021 WL 3710130, at *1 (D.
Utah Aug. 20, 2021).
43. Id.
44. Id. Although the issue did not arise in Vox Marketing, courts have held that cloud
tenancies—virtual computers created on public cloud computing systems—can qualify for
protection under the CFAA. See, e.g., Allscripts Healthcare, LLC v. Andor Health, LLC, No.
21-704, 2021 WL 4425767, at *2–3 (D. Del. Sept. 27, 2021) (upholding CFAA claim brought
by cloud tenant, but not by owner of the public cloud system).
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proposal.45 This competitor then discovered that because each URL for a
proposal or packing list ended with a string of numbers, by changing the
numbers, it could view multiple proposals and packing lists, allegedly
accessing the site more than 20,000 times.46
The court concluded that these facts could demonstrate the
competitor’s accessing of those URLs was without authorization, even
though they were not password protected: the competitor allegedly
learned of the site and the URLs for pricing proposals and packing lists
through unlawful conduct, knew the information was competitively
sensitive, and knew the site itself had a password—yet it accessed the
information anyway.47
Bowen and Vox Marketing make clear that having the ability to access
may not mean having authorization, and that context can determine the
scope and extent of authorization.48 Van Buren and Vox Marketing leave
unsaid, as courts often do, that the stakes for a CFAA violation are split
between two extremes. There are high stakes: you could be convicted of
a felony, as Van Buren himself learned, with jail time and significant
collateral consequences.49 On the other hand, the same provision could
expose you to limited monetary liability in a civil suit.50 Bowen, a civil
suit, makes that point implicitly, distinguishing the criminal case in Van
Buren with a wave of the hand: “Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court’s
decision that the police officer could use the law enforcement database to
retrieve the license plate in question has no application to the issues before
this Court.”51
45. Vox Mktg., 2021 WL 3710130, at *1–2.
46. Id. at *2.
47. Id. at *4–5.
48. This is not necessarily a slam dunk argument. Some courts have held, expressly or
implicitly, that access can be authorization. See, e.g., Castellano Cosmetic Surgery Ctr., P.A.
v. Rashae Doyle, P.A., No. 21-CV-1088, 2021 WL 3188432, at *1–2, 10 (M.D. Fla. July 28,
2021) (finding that testimony that defendant had access to the system to download reports at
issue foreclosed finding a likelihood of success on the merits on preliminary injunction, even
though there was testimony that the defendant did not have authorization to access or download
those particular reports and the system lacked the ability to provide tiered access); Speckman v.
Fabrizio, 547 F. Supp. 3d 239, No. 21-CV-602, 2021 WL 2793053, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July 6,
2021) (concluding that, under the CFAA, having credentials to change passwords means
authorization to change the passwords).
49. Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1653 (2021).
50. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(1)(B) (setting forth a potential sentence of up to twenty
years for violations of § 1030), with id. § 1030(g) (permitting individuals injured by violations
of § 1030 to recover compensatory damages and injunctive relief in civil suits).
51. Bowen v. Porsche Cars, N.A., Inc., No. 21-CV-471, 2021 WL 4726586, at *1, *4
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 20, 2021). Bowen may do so because Van Buren focused on a different
provision of the CFAA, see id. at *4, *4 n.3, or because both Van Buren and the government
agreed that Van Buren was authorized to access the system and in Bowen that was disputed,
compare id. at *4, with id. at *5. Whatever the reason, Bowen distinguishes Van Buren with a
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To the Vox Marketing court, a mistake in a civil claim is not fatal:
someone who uses a URL not behind a password wall can still violate the
CFAA if the URL is not intended to be public and the person who accessed
it discovered it through unlawful means. Indeed, that decision ratchets up
the likelihood of a CFAA violation if the person knows the information at
the URL is sensitive or confidential and that the site owner intended it to
be behind a security wall of some kind.
In short, if “the information [a defendant] accessed exceed[s] what
[the plaintiff] had previously authorized[,] Van Buren, in turn, does not
legally bar [the] claim.”52 The CFAA still has teeth.

flourish.
52. Leitner v. Morsovillo, No. 21-CV-3075, 2021 WL 2669547, at *4 (W.D. Mo. June
29, 2021) (upholding post-Van Buren CFAA claim).

